Key Points and Summary – The current U.S. bomber force is a “hollowed-out sword,” dangerously antiquated and too small for modern great-power competition.
-With only 19 stealthy B-2s capable of penetrating advanced defenses, the fleet is ill-equipped for a potential conflict with China.
B-21 Raider. Image Credit: U.S. Air Force.
-The new B-21 Raider is the solution, but the planned fleet of 100 is a “dangerously inadequate half-measure.”
-To credibly deter and, if necessary, win a two-front war against both China and Russia, the United States must procure a fleet of at least 200 B-21s.
-Anything less is a gamble with national security.
The B-21 Raider Is a Must for the U.S. Air Force
For the better part of three decades, the United States has enjoyed a luxury its rivals could only dream of: the ability to project overwhelming military power anywhere on the globe, anytime it chose, with near impunity. This dominance was underwritten by a fleet of long-range bombers that could hold any adversary at risk.
But in the quiet corridors of the Pentagon, a deeply unsettling reality has taken hold. That era is over.
The Threat the B-21 Raider Must Address
The rise of near-peer competitors in China and Russia has fundamentally changed the strategic landscape.
We are now faced with adversaries who have spent two decades methodically building sophisticated anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) networks designed for a single purpose: to break the back of American power projection.
The B-21 Raider was unveiled to the public at a ceremony December 2, 2022 in..Palmdale, Calif. Designed to operate in tomorrow’s high-end threat environment, the B-21 will play a critical role in ensuring America’s enduring airpower capability. (U.S. Air Force photo)
Our bomber force, once the unquestioned sword of the republic, is now a hollowed-out and dangerously antiquated fleet.
The B-21 Raider is the answer to this challenge. It is, without exaggeration, the most important strategic platform of this century. But the current plan to procure a “minimum” of 100 aircraft is not a strategy; it is a dangerously inadequate half-measure.
Take it from me: to secure American interests and deter a great-power war in the 21st century, the United States needs a fleet of at least 200 B-21 Raider stealth bombers. Anything less is a gamble with our national security that we cannot afford to take.
A Hollowed-Out Sword: America’s Antiquated Bomber Force
To understand the urgency for the B-21 Raider, you must first confront the alarming state of our current bomber force.
It is a geriatric fleet, a relic of the Cold War that is ill-suited for the challenges of today. Of our 158 bombers, only the 19 B-2 Spirits possess the stealth characteristics necessary to penetrate modern, integrated air defense systems. Let me repeat that: just 20 aircraft are capable of surviving in the contested airspace of a peer adversary like China.
The rest of the force is comprised of B-52s, magnificent but ancient machines designed in the 1950s, and B-1n Lancers, which, while fast, are plagued by maintenance issues and are not stealthy. These are standoff platforms, capable of launching cruise missiles from hundreds of miles away, but they cannot get close enough to strike the hardened, mobile, or deeply buried targets that would be critical in a peer conflict.
This means that today, roughly 90 percent of America’s bomber force is effectively a garrison army, unable to engage in the actual fight. A fleet of just 19 penetrating bombers is not a credible deterrent; it is a boutique capability.
After accounting for routine maintenance, training, and the inevitable loss of even one or two aircraft in a conflict, the number of B-2s available to a combatant commander at any given moment is terrifyingly small.
This is not a force capable of fighting and winning a war against a peer competitor; it is a force stretched to its breaking point.
The Tyranny of Distance and the Pacific Pacing Threat
Nowhere is this weakness more apparent than in the Indo-Pacific. China has spent two decades and hundreds of billions of dollars constructing a formidable A2/AD network —a layered defense comprising long-range missiles, advanced radars, and modern fighter jets designed to do one thing: keep the United States out.
Let’s wargame it out: A crisis erupts over Taiwan. China’s missile forces immediately target our forward bases in Guam and Okinawa, cratering runways and making sustained air operations impossible. Our aircraft carriers, the floating symbols of American power, are forced to operate a thousand miles or more offshore, outside the lethal range of China’s carrier-killer ballistic missiles.
From that distance, our short-range tactical fighters, like the F-35, become almost irrelevant. They are tethered to a small and highly vulnerable fleet of aerial refueling tankers, which would be the first targets for China’s own long-range J-20 stealth fighters. In this scenario, the only weapon that can credibly reach the Chinese mainland, penetrate its defenses, and strike the targets that matter is a long-range, penetrating stealth bomber.
The B-21 Raider was designed for this exact problem. With an unrefueled range of thousands of miles, it can take off from secure bases in the continental United States, bypass the tyranny of distance, and hold at risk the command-and-control nodes, missile launchers, and naval bases that are the heart of China’s strategy. It is the key that unlocks the A2/AD puzzle. But a key is useless if you don’t have enough of them.
Why 100 is a Floor, Not a Fleet
The official Air Force plan for a minimum of 100 B-21s was conceived in a different geopolitical era. It is a number that is dangerously out of step with the reality of a two-front great-power competition. Senior military leaders, including the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, have already stated that the true requirement is likely closer to 145 aircraft or more. I would argue even that is not enough.
A fleet of 100 bombers is not a fleet of 100 operational aircraft. On any given day, a significant portion of the force will be down for maintenance, dedicated to training, or held in reserve. A realistic operational availability rate means that a 100-bomber force might only be able to generate 50-60 aircraft for a significant conflict.
Now, consider the strategic demands. We must be able to deter China in the Pacific while simultaneously deterring Russia in Europe. We must be able to blunt a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, a task that analyses from respected institutions like the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies suggest will require a massive, sustained bombing campaign.
A force of a few dozen available B-21s cannot do this. It cannot absorb the inevitable combat losses and continue to generate the sortie rates needed to win. A 100-bomber fleet forces us to choose which theater we will prioritize, a choice that invites aggression from the adversary we turn our back on. A fleet of 200 bombers, by contrast, gives us the capacity to credibly deter, and if necessary, fight and win, in both theaters simultaneously.
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The Price of Deterrence vs. the Cost of War
The argument against a larger B-21 Raider fleet will inevitably come down to cost. But this is a dangerously shortsighted calculation. The price of building an additional 100 B-21s over the next two decades is a fraction of the cost of a single year of a great-power conflict. It is an investment not in a weapon of war, but in a weapon of peace.
The B-21’s true value is its ability to deter our adversaries from ever starting a war in the first place. It is a weapon that imposes such a credible and overwhelming cost on an aggressor that it makes the prospect of conflict an act of irrational self-destruction.
A small, boutique force of 100 Raiders does not create this certainty. It invites miscalculation. A robust fleet of 200 or more removes all doubt. It is the ultimate insurance policy for American security, and it is a price we must be willing to pay.
About the Author: Harry J. Kazianis
Harry J. Kazianis (@Grecianformula) is Editor-In-Chief and President of National Security Journal. He was the former Senior Director of National Security Affairs at the Center for the National Interest (CFTNI), a foreign policy think tank founded by Richard Nixon based in Washington, DC. Harry has over a decade of experience in think tanks and national security publishing. His ideas have been published in the NY Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, CNN, and many other outlets worldwide. He has held positions at CSIS, the Heritage Foundation, the University of Nottingham, and several other institutions related to national security research and studies. He is the former Executive Editor of the National Interest and the Diplomat. He holds a Master’s degree focusing on international affairs from Harvard University.
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Vlad
August 27, 2025 at 8:34 am
Incorrect.
USA today now already has enough bomb-bomb bombers.
Enough to fry the WORLD. Fry it TWICE OVER.
The US is furiously and secretly planning to kneecap china (its foremost economic rival today) by How.
By one fine morning using all its continental bombers, including the rather or somewhat elderly b-52s, to whack the middle kingdom using many types of long-range missiles. From safe stand-off distance. Or position.
Missiles like the HALO, ARRW, HACM, LRASM and even nuke ones like LRSO and JASSM-XR and possibly ERAMs.
Those missiles will be used in conjunction with long-range surface fires, like LRHW from stealth zumwalt destroyers, tomahawk missiles from virginia stealth attack submarines, and long-range missiles from US Army typhon missile sites based in australia and the philippines.
When those missiles start flying, in precision strikes and in sustained volleys, KAPUT for the china-man.
Kaput, as in finished. Finito.