Key Points – Vladimir Putin’s recent high-profile visit to Russia’s Kursk region, following the expulsion of Ukrainian forces in April 2025 (reportedly with North Korean aid), is being framed by the Kremlin as a significant victory lap.
-This prompts a re-evaluation of Ukraine’s August 2024 incursion into Kursk, which initially seized considerable territory.
-While proponents at the time lauded it for showcasing offensive capability and disrupting Russian logistics, the operation’s ultimate outcome—ceding the territory back and providing Moscow a propaganda win—raises questions.
-Critics suggest the incursion may have overextended Ukrainian resources and risked escalation without achieving lasting strategic gains.
Did Ukraine Hand Putin His Kursk Victory Lap?
Russian President Vladimir Putin made a high-profile visit to the Kursk region this week, his first since Moscow’s forces, reportedly aided by North Korean troops, drove Ukrainian soldiers from Russian soil in April.
The visit marks a symbolic victory lap for the Kremlin, which has framed the operation as the successful repulsion of Ukraine’s largest cross-border incursion since World War II.
Putin’s unannounced stop in Kursk included meetings with local officials, volunteer groups, and a tour of a nuclear power plant. State media broadcast images of a relaxed and smiling president, seated with residents over tea and sweets. The photographs shared with Russian media projected a vision of Russian leadership both calm and in control of a region once briefly under Ukrainian occupation.
Ukraine’s offensive last August stunned analysts at the time, with drone swarms and Western-supplied weapons breaching the Russian border and seizing control of nearly 540 square kilometers of Kursk territory. The operation ultimately proved short-lived, however. Now, with Russian missiles striking deep into Ukraine’s Sumy region and Moscow boasting of downed drones over its capital, it raises the question: Was the Kursk operation a strategic masterstroke or a costly miscalculation that ultimately handed Russia a major victory and propagandistic opportunity?
The optics of Putin’s visit suggest Moscow wants the world to believe the latter, but the answer may be more complicated.
Was the Kursk Incursion A Mistake?
In August 2024, Ukraine launched a surprise incursion into Russia’s Kursk region. The operation involved thousands of Ukrainian troops and utilized Western-supplied armored vehicles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that the goal was to create a “buffer zone” to prevent further Russian attacks across the border and to destroy as much of Russia’s war potential as possible.
The incursion caught both Russia and the West by surprise. While Western leaders did not publicly endorse the operation, there was no immediate condemnation at the time. The United States, for instance, offered no objections and then-Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh affirmed ongoing support for Ukraine even as its troops advanced in the region.
Proponents of the incursion argued that the operation successfully showcased Ukraine’s offensive capabilities, disrupted Russian military logistics, and bolstered Ukrainian morale. President Zelenskyy touted the success of the operation, stating that it demonstrated Ukraine’s ability to effectively challenge Russian forces.
Roman Kostenko, a Ukrainian lawmaker and officer in the Ukrainian security service, described the offensive as a “victory that we have not had for a long time.”
Many analysts also supported the operation’s strategic impact. Emil Kastehelmi, a Finnish military analyst, remarked that the advance was notably more successful than previous offensives. The Institute for the Study of War also noted that Ukrainian forces were able to pull off the offensive despite Russian authorities being aware of the possibility.
Beyond the obvious fact that Ukraine ultimately lost control of the region and handed Putin his recent victory lap, Ukraine arguably also overextended its forces during the assault. Analysts have noted that the operation diverted essential Ukrainian resources from critical fronts, particularly in the Donbas region, at the time.
Additionally, the decision carried the inherent risk of escalating the conflict and provoking a more aggressive response from Russia. Colonel Markus Reisner of the Austrian Armed Forces suggested that the operation might have been a diversion from challenges in Donbas, stating in August, “This is understandable and comprehensible, but it doesn’t solve the problems in Toretsk, Pokrovsk and Niu York.”
The attack also carried the risk of Russia labelling the incursion as a declaration of war by NATO, given how often Russian military and government leaders have previously said that incursion into Russian territory using Western-supplied munitions and weapons would constitute an escalation.
About the Author:
Jack Buckby is a British author, counter-extremism researcher, and journalist based in New York. Reporting on the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., he works to analyze and understand left-wing and right-wing radicalization, and reports on Western governments’ approaches to the pressing issues of today. His books and research papers explore these themes and propose pragmatic solutions to our increasingly polarized society. His latest book is The Truth Teller: RFK Jr. and the Case for a Post-Partisan Presidency.
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