Key Points and Summary on DDG(X) – The U.S. Navy’s DDG(X) next-generation guided-missile destroyer program, intended to replace aging Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, is facing a “nightmare” of cost overruns and delays.
-With a projected price tag of up to $3.4 billion per ship, procurement has been pushed back to at least 2032.
-The program is plagued by the same issues affecting the entire U.S. shipbuilding industry, which is being vastly outpaced by China.
-This has sparked debate over whether the Navy should cancel the ambitious DDG(X) and instead focus on producing more of the proven, less-costly Arleigh Burke Flight III destroyers.
The Navy’s DDG(X) Nightmare Explained
On April 23, 2025, US Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Pete Hegseth, in a speech to students at the prestigious US Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, announced that the Pentagon was launching a review of “all 72 active major defense acquisitions programs.”
This announcement was in accordance with President Donald J. Trump’s April 9 2025 executive order that that aims to modernize defense acquisitions and spur innovations in the defense industrial base. Among the stipulations of the executive order was a sub-bullet stating that “Any program more than 15% behind schedule or 15% over cost will be scrutinized for cancellation.”
The motivation driving the objectives of Messrs. Trump and Hegseth could hardly be overstated, as the DOD acquisition process is rife with horror stories of weapons systems that appear splendid on paper but consistently run afoul of the twin maladies of excessive cost overruns and production and delivery delays.
The DDG(X), sadly, seems to be running afoul in a similar manner.
DDG(X) – Semantic Clarification
“DDG” simply stands for “Guided Missile Destroyer,” which refers to a multi-mission
(Anti-Air Warfare [AAW], Anti-Submarine Warfare [ASW], and Anti-Surface Warfare [ASUW]) surface warship. Meanwhile, as per Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs for the Congressional Research Service (CRS), “X means the precise design for the ship has not yet been determined.”
DDG(X) Premise and Promise
As is true of the two submarine classes we discussed in the first half of this series, the DDG(X) appears to be a great concept.
They’re envisioned as the backbone of the USN’s fleet into the mid-21st century, intended to replace the Navy’s Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers (which were commissioned between 1983 and 1994) and older iterations of the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers (the original Flight I Burke warships were commissioned between 1991 and 1997; Flight II from 1998 to 1999).
Yes, you read that correctly; the DDG(X) is supposed to replace both existing cruisers and destroyers across the fleet, performing both defensive duties (protecting carriers and other high-end vessels) as well as offensive missions. To perform these duties, the prospective destroyers would presumably be armed with:
-A multi-purpose 5-inch gun
-Standard-sized Mk. 41 vertical launch systems (VLS) for air defense missiles, long-range anti-submarine rockets, cruise missiles, and anti-ship missiles
-Perhaps most impressively, one or two short-range lasers with adjustable power levels (150/600kW) that can blind UAVs or shoot down incoming missiles.
These ships would also offer potential advantages in range, stealth, and power systems (such as better electronics and cooling mechanisms.
So far, so good, right? Sounds ideal, right?
DDG(X) Doldrums: Problems with the Program
However, as already indicated, the DDG(X) program, which sounds marvelous in theory, is in danger of being (proverbially) left dead in practice due to excessive expenses and production delays.
Just how severe is Dollars & Sense? As one of my colleagues, Dr. Brent M. Eastwood notes in his December 14 2024 article titled “The Navy’s DDG(X) Destroyer Nightmare Explained in 1 Word,” “According to the Congressional Budget Office estimates, each DDG(X) may set the navy back $3.1 to $3.4 billion.”
Regarding the production delays, procurement was initially planned for 2028, but it now appears that the DDX(G) ships won’t begin construction until 2032.
What’s the Solution?
More Arleigh Burkes (specifically the Flight III)? The Zumwalt-class destroyers, perhaps?
You can pretty much nix the notion of the latter class of destroyers. The Zumwalts have turned out to be much ado about relatively little; though 32 of these ships were originally planned, that project was cancelled after only three were built.
The Flight III Arleigh Burke vessels might be a more viable option; to cite Brent Eastwood again, critics point out that the razzle-dazzle features of the DDG(X), such as the hypersonic missiles and lasers “could perhaps be added later to the Burke-class warships … It is unclear if lawmakers could stomach such an expense [of DDG(X), that is] when the capabilities of the Flight III variants of Arleigh Burkes are similar.”
The Flight III Burkes are certainly still relatively fresh on the scene. The first ship of the batch, USS Jack H. Lucas (DDG-125), was successfully launched on June 4, 2021. The second of the bunch, USS Louis H. Wilson Jr. (DDG-126), had its keel laid on May 16, 2023. For that matter, several of the Flight IIA Burke destroyers were built in the current decade.
However, whether the Navy chooses to stick with the DDG(X) or fall back on the Arleigh Burke Flight III, they’ll run afoul of the same obstacle: the sorry state of shipbuilding in the United States. As Indo-Pacific (INDOPACOM) Commander Admiral Samuel J. Paparo Jr. informed his audience at the McCain Institute’s annual Sedona Forum back on May 2, 2025, China’s shipyards produce six combat vessels for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) annually, compared with the 1.8 manufactured in the US.
Thankfully, on the same April 9, 2025, date as the E.O. directing the modernization of defense acquisition systems, President Trump issued an additional E.O. aimed at “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance.”
However, these proverbial seeds that the POTUS planted cannot be realistically expected to bear fruit overnight.
About the Author: Christian D. Orr, Defense Expert
Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor. He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU).
