The Russia-China-India ‘Troika’ is Here

Key Points and Summary – A new strategic “Troika” aligning Russia, China, and India is on the verge of becoming a reality, signaling a major geopolitical victory for Moscow and Beijing and a significant setback for Washington.

-This emerging bloc is not an inflexible anti-American alliance but a pragmatic convergence of interests.

-Driven by Russia’s need for support, China’s desire to neutralize a potential threat, and India’s quest for strategic autonomy amid its own complex rivalries, the partnership effectively shatters the long-held American foreign policy goal of splitting Russia from China, creating a formidable new power center in global politics.

A New ‘Axis’? The Geopolitical Earthquake of the Russia-China-India Troika 

Virtually every recent assessment of Russo-Chinese relations in 2025 has discerned their growing closeness. Indeed, Russia’s visible dependence on China to finance and prosecute its war with Ukraine is increasingly clear. At the same time, both Russia and China regularly proclaim their friendship and the identity of their views on significant issues in international politics and the necessity of closer coordination. Foreign Minister Wang Yi told European officials that China cannot afford a Russian defeat in Ukraine, lest it have to confront the full brunt of US power. The growing intimacy and scope of their joint military relations and exercises also warrant serious attention and scrutiny from observers.

Nevertheless, this relationship is not one of inflexible, static anti-Americanism. It now appears that Moscow and Beijing are on the verge of a major geopolitical victory. This victory entails the creation of a series of understandings among Russia, China, and India. The groundwork for this formation has already been laid. Apart from the Russo-Chinese entente, India has maintained seventy years of close ties with Russia and greatly depends on Russia’s defense industry for its military needs.

More recently, due to the war in Ukraine, it has become a major importer of Russian oil and gas. Its imports of Russian oil actually rose significantly in June 2025. These imports are crucial to fuel India’s growing energy needs and economic growth. Moreover, it has little or no patience for European and/or Western threats of sanctions, given the West’s extensive consumption of Russian gas and oil.

India’s motives for reaching a deal with China at this point also must be understood. Although the underlying and long-running geopolitical rivalry with China persists, India cannot engage China as an open adversary. As a recent paper from Chatham House observes, India is neither and will not be a Western ally against China anytime soon, nor can it confront China at present. There are several reasons for this outcome. First, in 2024, despite prolonged and complex negotiations, the border issue with China was solved. Second, India has always adamantly insisted upon its unquestioned strategic autonomy and will not be an adjunct to other states’ policies. So, while it is associated with the US, Australia, and Japan in the Quad, it is by no means their ally against China. Third, as this report indicates, “India’s dependence on China as a supplier of components and raw materials for its industrial development. That reliance undermines the narrative sometimes advanced by Western policymakers in which India emerges as a beneficiary of the push to de-risk or diversify global supply chains away from China.”

Fourth, China’s unwavering support for Pakistan in the recent crisis between India and Pakistan was crucial in denying  India a victory. Meanwhile, Pakistan supports terrorist attacks on India and uses its nuclear shield and Chinese weapons transfers to inhibit a decisive win and prevent India from being the undisputed hegemon on the subcontinent of South Asia. Fifth, the Trump Administration’s erratic policy on tariffs threatens India’s economic growth, undermines any concept of mutual trust with Washington, and erodes the basis of the Indo-American partnership, which is the most Washington can realistically attain.

For all these reasons, a truce or a timeout with China makes eminent sense for India. For China, this agreement alleviates the potential threat posed by an angry India, especially given the hostility to China that is a recurring theme in the Trump Administration’s policies. Clearly, China, as in its stance on Ukraine, aims to reduce the possibilities for American-backed pressure on it from Ukraine, India, and Southeast Asia.

Therefore, despite the massive Chinese naval and nuclear buildup of its forces in and around Southeast Asia, China, along with Russia, is now willing to sign the treaty making Southeast Asia a nuclear-free zone and score a march on the United States. Indian willingness to accept the status quo on the border and other issues also confirms the correctness of China’s view that India, while a potential threat, cannot compete with China as a great power in Asia and allows it to downplay, if not ignore, Indian claims. i.e, despite the border agreement with India, China is continuing to advance its claims in the territory of Arunachal Pradesh in Northeast India. Thus, having confirmed its apparent victory in talks between Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar and Chairman Xi at the Shanghai Cooperative Organization summit, China greenlighted the Russian proposal to revive this Troika. Thus, China has won a significant diplomatic victory.

But so has Russia. Its Troika initiative dates back thirty years to Yevgeny Primakov, who feared that as Russia had no choice but to draw closer to China in the 1990s, it risked being caught between its two main Asian partners’ enduring rivalry. Now, Russia will gain both international standing and, more importantly, diplomatic and economic support against Western pressures, including sanctions. It will also gain more space for its long-standing quest to be acknowledged as a major Asian player.  Therefore, Russia has assiduously pursued this idea and now that India has signaled its receptivity to it, stands, along with China, on the verge of a significant diplomatic achievement. Moscow, along with Beijing, has long argued that the Quad and the concept of the Indo-Pacific are exclusionary projects against it and China, which are merely artificial constructions. Now, its persistence in this quest appears to have come to fruition.

Conclusions 

Finally, these developments mark a significant defeat in US policy that has pursued the chimera of a “reverse Nixon,” i.e., breaking apart the Sino-Russian alliance. This delusion is not founded on reality, given Moscow’s dependence on Beijing, among other factors.

Now, in no small part due to the heavy-handed policies towards China and India, this Troika is becoming a fundamental factor in Asian and global politics. Hopefully, the Administration will learn from this defeat and reverse its course, rather than adopting Nixon and Kissinger’s statecraft.

About the Author: Dr. Stephen Blank

Dr. Stephen J. Blank is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program. He has published over 900 articles and monographs on Soviet/Russian, U.S., Asian, and European military and foreign policies, testified frequently before Congress on Russia, China, and Central Asia, consulted for the Central Intelligence Agency, major think tanks and foundations, chaired major international conferences in the US and in Florence; Prague; and London, and has been a commentator on foreign affairs in the media in the US and abroad. He has also advised major corporations on investing in Russia and is a consultant for the Gerson Lehrmann Group. He is the author of Russo-Chinese Energy Relations: Politics in Command (London: Global Markets Briefing, 2006), and Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2005). Dr. Blank is also the author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissariat of Nationalities (Greenwood, 1994); and the co-editor of The Soviet Military and the Future (Greenwood, 1992).

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