Key Points – The official retirement of the SR-71 Blackbird in 1990 was driven more by internal US Air Force politics and budget priorities than by high operational costs or obsolescence, according to Ben Rich, the former director of Lockheed’s Skunk Works.
-Rich alleged that then-Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry Welch led a campaign to kill the program to divert its funding to the B-2 bomber.
-The decision was almost immediately regretted, as commanders in Operation Desert Storm lamented the absence of the SR-71’s unique reconnaissance capabilities.
-Despite a brief, partially funded reactivation, the program was permanently terminated by 1998.
Why the SR-71 Was Retired
For the past 35 years, we’ve been told that the SR-71 Blackbird was retired due to a combination of factors, including high operational costs and the advancement of satellite technology.
However, a book by Skunk Works Director Ben Rich, who succeeded the iconic Kelly Johnson, suggests that money wasn’t the issue but rather politics.
The Blackbird Is Still A Marvel Of Engineering
Lockheed’s SR-71 Blackbird, first flown nearly 60 years ago, remains unmatched as the fastest crewed jet ever.
The Blackbird outran over 4,000 missiles; it combined revolutionary stealth, sustained Mach 3+ speed, and advanced engineering, making it virtually untouchable.
While streaking across the sky at 80,000 feet, the SR-71 could photograph 100,000 square miles of terrain in an hour.
The SR-71 was the most successful design of famed aeronautical engineer Kelly Johnson. Johnson had already proven his design mettle with previous projects, such as World War II’s P-38 Lightning, America’s first jet fighter — the P-80 Shooting Star, and most notably, the high-flying U-2 Spy Plane.
Johnson’s secret work during the U-2 program led to the establishment of the secretive military facility many of us know today as Area 51.
What was most amazing about the Blackbird wasn’t just that it could reach a speed of Mach 3.2 (some pilots say even faster), but it could sustain those speeds for an indefinite amount of time, complete the mission, and fly again the next day. Supposedly, the Russian MiG-25 could reach Mach 3.2, but only for a very short window of time. And after that, its engine was junk.
“The SR-71, on the other hand, would sustain those speeds for hours on end without a hitch, thanks to its incredible Pratt & Whitney J58 turbojet engines that included bypass tubes that funneled cold air directly into the afterburners (leading to the J58 sometimes being called a “turboramjet”) and the engine’s first-of-their-kind directionally solidified turbine blades that could withstand higher temperatures than any jet engine previously could.”
So, Why Did The Air Force Really Retire The SR-71 Blackbird?
Despite the incredible record and characteristics of the Blackbird, the Air Force retired the SR-71 on January 26, 1990. As quoted by Aviation Geek Club:
“General Larry Welch, the Air Force chief of staff, staged a one-man campaign on Capitol Hill to kill the program entirely,” Ben Rich (Director of Lockheed’s Skunk Works from 1975 to 1991, succeeding Kelly Johnson) wrote in his book Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years of Lockheed.
“General Welch thought sophisticated spy satellites made the SR-71 a disposable luxury. Welch had headed the Strategic Air Command and was partial to its priorities. He wanted to use SR-71 refurbishment funding for the development of the B-2 bomber. Columnist Rowland Evans quoted him as saying, ‘The Blackbird can’t fire a gun and doesn’t carry a bomb, and I don’t want it.’
“Then the general went on the Hill and claimed to certain powerful committee chairmen that he could operate a wing of fifteen to twenty [F-15E] fighter-bombers with what it cost him to fly a single SR-71. That claim was bogus. So were claims by SAC generals that the SR-71 cost $400 million annually to run. The actual cost was about $260 million.”
Rich later recalled that “a general would always prefer commanding a large fleet of conventional fighters or bombers that provides high visibility and glory. By contrast, buying into Blackbird would mean deep secrecy, small numbers, and no limelight.”
Did The Air Force Act Too Hastily?
Was that a fair assessment by Rich? While it may be tinged with a touch of scorn, it is hard to argue with Rich’s quote there. And it was justified just months later.
In August of 1990, Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Army invaded Kuwait, and the US led a coalition of countries in Operation Desert Shield, and later Desert Storm, when they took back Kuwait from Iraq.
During the many months in the desert, many operational commanders, including General Norman Schwarzkopf, lamented the absence of expedited reconnaissance that the SR-71 might have contributed.
Congress Considered Reactivating The Blackbird in 1993
In 1993, the reactivation of the SR-71 was reconsidered due to the unfolding situations in North Korea and the Middle East. Admiral Richard Macke, director of the Joint Staff for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in a meeting with Congress that the Blackbird was needed.
“From the operator’s perspective, what I need is something that will not give me just a spot in time but will give me a track of what is happening.
“When we are trying to find out if the Serbs are taking arms, moving tanks or artillery into Bosnia, we can get a picture of them stacked up on the Serbian side of the bridge. We do not know whether they then went on to move across that bridge.
“We need the [reconnaissance information] that a tactical, an SR-71, a U-2, or an unmanned vehicle of some sort, will give us, in addition to, not in replacement of, the ability of the satellites to go around and check not only that spot but a lot of other spots around the world for us. It is the integration of strategic and tactical.”
Congress authorized funding for a portion of the SR-71 fleet to be reactivated in FY 1994 funding. But the Air Force dragged its feet, which was no surprise. It wasn’t until late 1997 that President Bill Clinton cut the funding, using his line-item veto option. In 1998, the Blackbird was permanently clipped of its wings.
But after the final retirement flight in 1990, Senator John Glenn spoke in Congress, saying the retirement of an SR-71 was a “grave mistake.”
“The termination of the SR-71 was a grave mistake and could place our nation at a serious disadvantage in the event of a future crisis. Yesterday’s historic transcontinental flight was a sad memorial to our short-sighted policy in strategic aerial reconnaissance.”
Perhaps the Air Force has changed its mind as well, as it is now behind the development of the SR-72 Son of Blackbird (SOB).
About the Author:
Steve Balestrieri is a National Security Columnist. He served as a US Army Special Forces NCO and Warrant Officer. In addition to writing on defense, he covers the NFL for PatsFans.com and is a member of the Pro Football Writers of America (PFWA). His work was regularly featured in many military publications.
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