Americans remain deeply skeptical about Qatar. Critics point to its traditional support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist movements, its donations to groups that promote anti-Semitism if not excuse terror, Al Jazeera’s tendency to cross ethical lines, and largesse that appears less motivated by altruism and more by a desire for state-capture, Qatari officials respond such criticism is unfair. They argue successive U.S. administrations sought their mediation with groups like the Taliban and Hamas, and point to numerous U.S. military and intelligence officials who say U.S. cooperation with Qatar bolsters American counterterrorism in a volatile region.
Whether or not an explicit quid pro quo exists between Qatari funding and recipient policies appears irrelevant; the desire for Qatari money corrupts at the highest level, though, as with all such cases, those willing to corrupt themselves are more guilty than those who offer cash streams and perks. Certainly, if Qatar did not bankroll Hamas and other Islamist movements, the region would be more stable. The personal politics of Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, Qatar’s emir, however, matter and are not open for internal debate, even if his foreign policy emphases create some unease, even at home.
I am a critic of Qatari policies, and have both questioned its Major Non-NATO Ally status, as to whether, alongside Pakistan and Turkey, its support for specific movements crosses the line into state sponsorship of terror. Qataris are frustrated, they say, that they cannot win. While many Americans question their contribution to the Taliban talks—Qatar certainly did not shed a tear when the Taliban voided its commitments and took over the country—Qatari officials say they acted on Washington’s behalf and took instruction from both the first Donald Trump administration and then President Joe Biden’s team.
Qataris are likewise frustrated that many Americans—especially American Jews—question whether Qatar’s mediation regarding Jewish hostages held in cages and tunnels by Hamas was a net positive, or if Qatar simply provided cover and tacit support for Hamas.
Africans, however, see Qatari mediation differently. Eritrea is among the world’s most difficult countries. Longtime dictator Isaias Afwerki is both stubborn and erratic; there is not a single country Eritrea borders with whom Afwerki has not provoked a fight or tried to meddle, sometimes at the cost of tens of thousands of lives. In 2008, Eritrean troops pushed into Djibouti, kidnapping both soldiers and civilians. Just as Hamas, Azerbaijan and Iran do, the Eritreans refused to acknowledge the true number of hostages they took, releasing the names of some but leaving others to languish in prison without acknowledgement. Qatar interceded and won the release of most prisoners, including some that Eritrea did not initially admit holding. Part of its strategy might have just been skilled diplomacy; Qatar will not admit acknowledge bribing captors.
It is not only hostage situations that Qatar involves itself in, but increasingly in broader conflict mediation. Africa’s “Great Lakes” regime is perhaps the continent’s most violent region. In 1994, Hutu extremists launched an anti-Tutsi genocide in Rwanda. Paul Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front ended the genocide, but Hutu génocidaires fled into the forests of the Democratic Republic of Congo; the Hutu extremists then contributed to two major wars across Congo resulted in the deaths of millions of people. To be fair, however, others bore responsibility as well. Congolese leaders have agency. Successive leaders from Mobutu Sese Seko who dominated the country through the late 20th century, and (called Zaire between 1971 and 1997), Laurent-Désiré Kabila and his son Joseph, and incumbent president Félix Tshisekedi were each hopeless corrupt, though Tshisekedi has taken corruption to new levels.
While several countries—the United States, Angola, and Kenya—sought to resolve conflict in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Tshisekedi refused to negotiate in good faith; he also simultaneously blamed external actors like Rwanda for the internal uprising and local rebellions that his cynical ethnic incitement and general incompetence sparked while refusing to cease such incitement for fear that Congolese would then turn on him.
In March 2025, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani hosted a trilateral meeting in Doha with Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Kagame, the first direct talks between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda in more than two years and the first meeting between their presidents in three.
Qatar also hosted M23 insurgents in April and May 2025 to allow Tshisekedi to save face after his public refusals to negotiate with the group over local grievances. Ultimately, this led to direct talks between the Democratic Republic of Congo and M23, the real breakthrough, as Congo’s refusal to talk with M23 ultimately led the Luanda and Nairobi processes to stall and fail. The direct talks allowed Tshisekedi to reverse a major military buildup that he initiated in December 2024.
Qatar’s involvement shepherding these talks has been ongoing, and came with both significant expense and high-level attention in Qatar with Minister of State Mohammed Al-Khulaifi serving as the main mediator. The two countries are likely to sign a peace agreement in Washington today, and there could soon be a presidential ceremony including both Tshisekedi and Kagame. There is still more to do, of course, with a focus now on speeding up talks to reach an agreement between the Congolese government on one side, and M23 and the Alliance Fleuve Congo on the other.
Qatar’s role in Africa has been indispensable, whether between Eritrea and Djibouti or between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. The fact that Qatar maintained the trust of all parties throughout the processes really set them apart.
Frankly, this is possible in Africa because Qatar does not appear ideologically invested in any particular group; it is not in the Middle East or South Asia, where Qatari links to Islamists sows distrust in some quarters. The opposite dynamic exists in Africa, where France and Russia appear too ideologically or historically invested to be honest brokers.
Perhaps, then, the diplomatic off-ramp for Qatar to sidestep the criticism that so clear chafes its leaders is to focus its energy on other sub-Saharan African problems: The Central African Republic, Somalia where Turkey’s subterfuge has undercut its effectiveness, and Cameroon, where insurgency between the Francophone government and Anglophone separatists rage. Qatar has a role, resources, and a skillset, but its choice where to mediate matters.
Doha must recognize that, as with France in the Sahel, its involvement with certain groups in the Middle East is disqualifying, but opportunities abound to punch above its weight elsewhere.
About the Author: Dr. Michael Rubin
Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. The views expressed are his own.
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