North Korea’s 10/10 Military Parade: What To Watch For

Key Points and Summary – As North Korea holds a military parade this week, analysis suggests observers should look beyond the expected ICBMs and focus on two more critical developments.

-The first is any evidence of tactical, low-yield nuclear weapons, which would signal a dangerous doctrinal shift from deterrence to battlefield nuclear use.

M2020 Tank from North Korea. Image Credit: KCNA/North Korea State Media.

-The second is the display of advanced combat drones.

-Having gained experience in Ukraine, North Korea could use drones to offset its conventional army’s technological disadvantage against South Korea.

-These two capabilities represent a more immediate and destabilizing evolution in Pyongyang’s military strategy.

North Korea: What Will They Show the World During Their Military Parade? 

North Korea will display its latest military hardware in a parade this week. Such parades are a regular occurrence. As a Stalinist state persisting past the Cold War-era, the North likes to show its deterrence against enemies — internal and external — with extravagant displays of hardware.

Much of this year’s focus is on a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Hwasong-20. The Hwasong series has given North Korea the range it would need to hit the U.S. mainland since 2017. But it is widely suspected that North Korea struggles with guidance and re-entry: We do not know how well its ICBMs can reach a specific location on a map when launched from a great distance, nor do we know if its warheads can survive re-entry into the atmosphere from space.

There is suspicion that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have given the North Koreans help in solving these doubts in exchange for their assistance in the Ukraine war. In the meantime, there are two other kinds of weapon systems North Korea observers are also watching for — tactical nuclear weapons and drone systems.

Will North Korea Build Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons?

North Korea has announced in the past that it would construct tactical, or low-yield, nuclear weapons. A nuclear weapon’s “yield” is the amount of energy it releases, and a “low” yield is generally considered anything less than 5 kilotons. The weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had yields of about 20 kilotons.

All nuclear-armed states have large, high-yield nukes. These are intended for use only as a last defense. Launched at an attacker’s cities, they would do devastating damage. They therefore deter other countries from attack. This manner of nuclear deterrence goes back decades, and it appears that North Korea has achieved it with its ICBMs and six nuclear tests.

But the use of small nuclear weapons to supplement conventional forces on the battlefield has long been a temptation for nuclear states. In theory, a small nuclear weapon could function like very powerful conventional artillery. Just one warhead could do tremendous damage to enemy forces. For small and vulnerable states, the appeal is obvious. Mini-nukes could correct punishing conventional imbalances. This is particularly attractive to North Korea, given how far behind it is compared to its American, South Korean, and Japanese opponents.

In an inter-Korean conflict, North Korean mini-nukes could halt any northward advance by South Korean formations. Thus any sign during North Korea’s parades that it has attained tactical nuclearization is crucial. The development of such weapons would imply that North Korea not only seeks an arsenal for traditional deterrence, but for battlefield use too.

What Has North Korea Learned from Drone Warfare in Ukraine?

Wars quickly bring successful technologies to the fore. They harshly demonstrate how prized, prestigious legacy systems may no longer be useful.

Conversely, underdeveloped, overlooked platforms may suddenly shape the battlefield. In Ukraine, the decline of the tank and armored vehicle when faced with the ubiquity of the drone has been just such a story.

Every military in the world is noting just how much traditional land warfare has been taken over by small, cheap, flying killing machines.

As a land power with a massive army, this lesson is especially pertinent for North Korea. Pyongyang may go nuclear in a war, but that would come with huge risks.

It would prefer to fight conventionally, at least for a while, until a peace deal could be struck and nuclear escalation avoided.

The traditional North Korean strategy has been to militarize the entire country. Everyone serves in the military for long conscription terms, and the North’s standing army is three times larger than the South’s. But South Korea is so technologically far ahead that there is much skepticism that North Korean mass could succeed against South Korean quality.

Drones offer a potential exit from this dilemma. North Korean troops serving in Ukraine have much greater experience with drone combat than the South Korean or U.S. armies.

This gives North Korea, uncharacteristically, a conventional edge. If it can deploy drones across multiple army functions and formations, perhaps it can somewhat equalize the conventional imbalance and avoid early nuclear escalation.

North Korea has proven to be a surprisingly persistent opponent, and it has adopted technologies that give it a fighting chance.

Expect to see those new technologies on display.

About the Author: Dr. Robert Kelly, Pusan National University

Dr. Robert E. Kelly is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University in South Korea. His research interests focus on Security in Northeast Asia, U.S. foreign policy, and international financial institutions. He has written for outlets including Foreign Affairs, the European Journal of International Relations, and the Economist, and he has spoken on television news services including BBC and CCTV. His personal website/blog is here; his Twitter page is here.

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