Iran’s Ballistic Missiles Have a ‘Forgotten Source’: North Korea

Key Points – North Korea has played a critical, though often overlooked, role in developing the very Iranian military capabilities now being used against Israel.

-Iran’s Emad and Ghadr ballistic missiles, deployed in its recent retaliatory strikes, are advanced derivatives of the North Korean No Dong missile, developed with direct North Korean assistance and parts.

-Furthermore, since 2005, North Korean experts, led by Myong Lyu-do, reportedly designed and helped construct the hardened, deep underground tunnels at Iran’s Natanz and Isfahan nuclear sites, which were principal targets of Israel’s recent “Operation Rising Lion” air assault.

Iran’s Missiles Have North Korean DNA

The ongoing conflict between Iran and Israel that began on June 12, 2025, has been both deadly and compelling. Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, command and control, ballistic missile locations, and other key facilities has been targeted and successful to date. Iran’s response to these attacks has targeted Israeli population centers and, as of June 15, 2025, has caused some damage to civilian infrastructure and casualties, including at least 19 reported dead.

This conflict appears to be something that may continue for several weeks. Israel plans to destroy as much of Iranian capabilities that can target the Jewish state with nuclear weapons—particularly underground sites and the platforms (ballistic missiles) capable of carrying these weapons that appear to be close to complete development—as possible.

Seemingly lost in the coverage of these critical developments is the role that North Korea has played in assisting the Iranians in their WMD capabilities, not only in their ability to target Israel but also in protecting Tehran’s underground facilities.

What Kind of Missiles Did Iran Launch at Israel?

Based on reporting of the recent Iranian ballistic missile attacks on Israel, it appears there were at least three key types of ballistic missiles fired from Iran at Israel in its initial attacks.

The reported missile types include the Emad, Ghadr, and Kheibar Shekan. Two of the three (the Emad and the Ghadr) are nothing more than “souped up” No Dongs (the third appears to be solid fuel, and there is no evidence that it came from North Korea). But the Emad and Ghadr would not be in Iran’s inventory were it not due to North Korean proliferation and assistance.

The proliferation and development story goes like this: The North Koreans provided the No Dongs (at least 150 of them) to Iran. Then Iran asked the North Koreans to build a No Dong “factory” for them in Iran.

However, the facility still needed many North Korean parts and North Korean specialists (engineers and technicians) to manufacture the missiles in Iran—called the Shahab-3.

The Shahab-3 is almost an exact copy of the No Dong. From there, the North Koreans assisted the Iranians in improving the range and firepower of the missile—what many analysts have called a “collaboration effort.”

From this effort was born the Emad and the Ghadr.

These were two of the three types of ballistic missiles identified as being used in the early attacks on Israel.

North Korean Support to Iran’s Nuclear Weaponization Program?

While there were early reports (unconfirmed and rarely commented on) that North Korea was assisting Iran with the designs for a 500-kilogram highly enriched uranium warhead for a missile, there has been almost nothing on this reporting in the past 20 years.

This collaboration may have occurred (if it occurred) during the period when A.Q. Khan’s Pakistani nuclear bazaar, which is confirmed to have proliferated nuclear weaponization technology to North Korea, Libya, and Iran, was shut down. Iran needed to turn elsewhere for technological support—for a price. At any rate, the evidence remains sketchy yet concerning if true.

The evidence regarding North Korea’s construction of underground, highly protected facilities for the nuclear weaponization program is far more concerning. According to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “The IRGC reportedly drew on North Korean expertise (and used an IRGC cutout, the “Shahid Rajaei” company) in order to construct a defense infrastructure that would protect and conceal its military nuclear program. This included extensive tunneling and hardening projects at the Natanz and Isfahan nuclear sites. Initiated in 2005, the project was under the authority of the Nuclear Control Center, an IRGC entity that oversees Iran’s nuclear program. It enjoyed on-site North Korean technical support under the direction of Myong Lyu-do, a leading North Korean expert on underground facilities, who arrived in Iran in June 2005.”

The site at Natanz has been one of the key targets of Israeli airpower in recent days. According to a Janes Defence Weekly report from January 25, 2006, apparently addressing these same facilities, quoted in the Congressional Research Service, “Another form of North Korean-Iranian nuclear collaboration reportedly involved a huge Iranian project to develop underground bunkers and tunnels for elements of Iran’s nuclear program. The project, estimated to have cost hundreds of millions of dollars, included the construction of 10,000 meters of underground halls for nuclear equipment connected by tunnels measuring hundreds of meters branching off from each hall. Specifications reportedly called for reinforced concrete tunnel ceilings, walls, and doors resistant to explosions and penetrating munitions.”

According to press sources quoted in the Congressional Research Service document, “The IRGC implemented the project. North Korea reportedly participated in the design and construction of the bunkers and tunnels. In early 2005, Myong Lyu-do, a leading North Korean expert on underground facilities, traveled to Tehran to run the program of North Korean assistance.”

Can North Korea-Iran Military Ties Be Cut? 

It should be evident from the evidence presented above that North Korea has proliferated and assisted with Iranian ballistic missiles.

These missiles have made their mark in the recent violence between Iran and Israel. The evidence regarding North Korea’s assistance to North Korea’s hardened underground nuclear facilities is also quite compelling. These are key pieces of evidence that have received very little attention in recent days, yet North Korea’s role in Iran’s military capabilities remains quite compelling.

The need to contain North Korea’s role in proliferating weapons and other key capabilities, not only to Iran but to its proxies, should be a foreign policy priority. The best way to do this is to squeeze North Korea’s ability to operate in the Middle East—particularly Iran.

This can only be done non-kinetically by going after North Korea’s dirty money and illicit trade. While there have been efforts in the past to do this, these efforts need to be increased in terms of scope and focus. If that does not happen, we will continue to see North Korea knee-deep in proliferating to rogue states and non-state actors.

About the Author: Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. 

Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. is a professor of Political Science at Angelo State University. He is also the president of the International Council on Korean Studies and a fellow at the Institute for Korean American Studies. The author of five books dealing with North Korea, his latest work is entitled North Korean Military Proliferation in the Middle East and Africa.

Fighter Jet Fails

Russia’s Su-57 Felon Stealth Fighter Is a Waste of Rubles

America’s YF-23 Black Widow II Might Be Better Than F-22 

Russia’s Su-75 Checkmate Fighter Won’t Fly