How the U.S.-India Relationship Went ‘Dreadfully Wrong’

PUBLISHED on August 8, 2025, 12:25 PM EDT – Key Points and Summary – A promising U.S.-India partnership has soured dramatically in the first months of the second Trump administration, leaving New Delhi in a difficult strategic position.

A once-expected alignment against China has been upended by President Trump’s pursuit of a trade deal with Beijing, his even-handed approach to the recent India-Pakistan conflict, and most damagingly, the imposition of severe “secondary tariffs” on India for purchasing Russian oil.

This unpredictable and hostile turn from Washington has shattered the belief that India had a reliable friend in the White House and risks long-term damage to the critical relationship.

India and America: A Partnership That Collapsed? 

India has found itself in a difficult strategic situation, one that was not altogether predictable at the beginning of the year. In January 2025 there was every reason to expect that relations between India and the United States would develop into a major partnership. President Trump and Prime Minister Modi have similar ideological outlooks.

The Trump administration has made geopolitical competition with China a key pillar of its foreign policy, a position that seemed destined to make a partnership with India attractive to Washington. Finally, Trump suggested deepening the US-India arms and technology relationship by exporting advanced military equipment to India.

But somewhere things went dreadfully wrong. President Trump has promised to levy severe trade sanctions on New Delhi, throwing India’s economy and strategic outlook into chaos. What happened?

Competition

India seemed primed to take advantage of historic low points in the US relationships with both Pakistan and China.

The need to placate both Islamabad and Beijing has long been a thorn in the US-Indian relationship, and a deterioration of relations with both countries seemed to open an opportunity for India. However, the first six months of the Trump administration have not worked out as well as hoped.

Despite his anti-China rhetoric, it has become apparent that Trump places enormous value on the prospect of a major trade deal with Beijing. As we shall see, this has had the effect of insulating China from some trade sanctions as negotiations continue, resulting in a degree of diplomatic latitude that has not been extended to India.

The situation with Pakistan is no better. In May 2025, partially in response to a terrorist attack launched by a Pakistan-based militia group, India conducted Operation Sindoor, a set of attacks intended to convince Pakistan to police its proxies.

India may have hoped that the US would lean to one side in this conflict, but this does not appear to have happened. Instead, the US took a relatively even-handed approach to the conflict. Pakistan has adopted an overtly obsequious policy towards the Trump administration, nominating Trump personally for the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in helping to negotiate a ceasefire with India. Moreover, the end of the US role in the war in Afghanistan has removed a major impediment from US-Pakistani reconciliation.

Technology

Operation Sindoor revealed a potentially more significant problem. India managed to inflict damage on Pakistan, but the scrum revealed that India did not have the degree of technological advantage over Pakistan that it had hoped.

Reports vary on how many aircraft Pakistan shot down, but the losses certainly included at least one French-built Rafale fighter. The Rafale, a 4.5 generation fighter that was supposed to represent a qualitative advantage over the aircraft in Pakistan’s fleet, was evidently shot down by a long-range missile fired from a Chinese-built J-10 fighter.

It is not clear that any partner other than the United States can offer India a significant, long-term qualitative advantage over its regional competitors.

Part of the problem is that India’s defense industrial base (DIB) remains deeply tied to Russia. For reasons structural and ideological, it has been difficult for India to detach itself from Russia, even as the Russian DIB has ground itself to dust in Ukraine.

But Russia cannot supply the kinds of weapons that will give India a long-term advantage over Pakistan or China. The Indians are fully aware of the problem and have taken steps to both improve the relationship with the US and reduce dependence upon Russia, but progress is slow.

Indeed, as the technological gap between Europe and the United States grows, it is not obvious that even the Europeans can resolve India’s technological requirements.

Russia and Economics

The Indian government most likely did not regard the Russia-Ukraine War as a major obstacle to friendly relations with the Trump administration. Trump has minimal sympathy for Ukraine or for the mechanics of the “liberal international order” that the Biden administration used to punish Russia economically. Even if Trump could not bring the war to a close, he was unlikely to use all of the levers of power at his disposal to hurt Russia’s economic partners.

Unfortunately for India, things have not worked out as expected. Predictably, Trump has not been able to bring the war to a close, largely because of Russian intransigence. This seems to have set off a level of personal pique between the American and Russian leaders, leaving Trump to search for tools with which to harm Russia.

“Secondary tariffs,” which were not really a thing that anyone had thought could exist before Trump 47, have now been implemented against New Delhi in an effort to force India to cease purchases of Russian hydrocarbons. This has upset both the Indian economy and the Indian belief that it had a reliable friend in Washington.

What Happens Next?

There is no easy solution here. The Modi government may have envisioned Trump’s return to power as an opportunity to conclude a generational partnership.

Fortunately or no, the unpredictability of Trump’s foreign policy machine has put India into a difficult position. However, the onus is not simply on India. It is quite possible that Trump has badly misunderstood India’s diplomatic position, believing that the United States has far more leverage than is actually the case.

India’s foreign policy has always been characterized by a proud independence and an unwillingness to let a superpower (either Moscow or Washington) lead it by the nose. If Trump has miscalculated, he may have put efforts to bring New Delhi into technological accord with the US DIB in jeopardy, along with the rest of the strategic partnership.

About the Author: Dr. Robert Farley, University of Kentucky  

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), and most recently Waging War with Gold: National Security and the Finance Domain Across the Ages (Lynne Rienner, 2023). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money. You can find him on X: @DrFarls. 

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