During the NATO Summit in June, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that further sanctions on Russia now would prevent Moscow from engaging in dialogue to end the war in Ukraine. Since then, President Trump expressed his willingness to levy tariffs on Russian exports, but only with a 50-day delay – now shortened to 10-12 days – to give Moscow another opportunity to negotiate in good faith.
The administration’s belief that the threat of future economic pressure would cause the Kremlin to change course and seek an end to the war has failed to produce results. Historically, Russia and other nations who have launched wars of aggression have been forced to cooperate in part because they have sought relief from economic pressure that had already been implemented. For the sanctions and tariffs on Russia’s exports to be useful for future negotiations, they must be levied in the first place.
What History Teaches Us
While economic measures have often been part of a broader coercive effort, there is a strong precedent for these tactics resulting in consequences for aggressors and a cessation of hostilities.
During the Bosnian War, the prospect of sanctions being lifted was one of the conditions that led to the signing of the Dayton Accords, the peace agreement that ended that conflict.
In the aftermath of the war in Kosovo, the economic harm caused by a multilateral sanctions regime and restrictions on financial assistance led to the ouster of Slobodan Milosevic and his eventual prosecution for war crimes at the Hague.
In strong contrast to these precedents, President Trump’s announcement of a 50-day delay in enacting economic restrictions on Russia was actually viewed positively by Moscow, as evidenced by the surge in Russia’s stock market.
The View From Russia
Moscow’s firsthand experience in suffering economic disruptions that have impacted military interventions occurred during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In response to the deployment of Soviet troops to Afghanistan, the U.S. levied a trade embargo, paused tech transfers, and halted arms control negotiations with the USSR. America’s diplomats during the 1980s made clear that the Soviet Union could only expect relief after it withdrew its forces from Afghanistan.
Today, as Putin continues to bomb civilians and espouse maximalist war aims, preemptively withholding pressure signals a lack of resolve and offers Moscow no incentive to end its war.
The State of Russia’s Economy
Russia’s current economic standing presents a unique opportunity to increase pressure on Vladimir Putin without expending significant U.S. resources. Moscow’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, used to fund Russia’s war effort, is at risk of being depleted.
As costs and default risks increase, Russian financial institutions are facing a debt crisis. During the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, the country’s Economic Development Minister warned of a recession in the near term if the country’s economic standing continues to worsen.
At a time when Russia needs access to new capital, implementing sanctions and tariffs that undercut the Russian war machine presents the quickest path to diminishing Putin’s imperial ambitions.
A Look to Kissinger…
That economic pressure offers crucial leverage in negotiations was not lost on Henry Kissinger, Secretary Rubio’s predecessor who also served concurrently as the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser.
Despite having many reservations about the use of economic sanctions broadly, he acknowledged the need for their use when dealing with Moscow. In 1982, Kissinger backed sanctions against a planned pipeline between Western Europe and the Soviet Union, noting that the approach would provide leverage for the U.S. to pursue “restrained international conduct” from the Kremlin. Years later, he would emphasize the suitability of sanctions for Russia over its aggression towards Ukraine. “[With] Russia being weak, sanctions are, of course, a normal weapon,” Kissinger would note during a Congressional briefing in 2018.
The Path Forward
“Strength is essential to negotiate successfully and protect our interests. If we’re weak, we can do neither,” President Reagan said in 1984 when discussing relations between Washington and Moscow. In order to convince the Kremlin to abandon its war aims, President Trump and Secretary Rubio must raise the costs of invading Ukraine for Russia. Secretary Rubio has experience in advocating for this approach.
After President Putin seized Crimea in 2014, then-Senator Rubio publicly called for the U.S. to levy severe sectoral sanctions on Moscow’s energy industry, noting that the U.S. “must never allow our desire for peace to lead us into weakness or inaction.” Ukraine and its partners are asking the U.S. for the same commitment today.
About the Author: Artur Kalandarov
Artur Kalandarov holds an MA in Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies from Stanford University and is a Senior Associate at The Cohen Group. His views do not necessarily reflect those of his firm.
D-O-Y-L-E
July 30, 2025 at 11:20 am
Sanctions, especially unrestrained sanctions are the work of the devil.
The devil, 👿, a.k.a. Asmodeus.
When genocide joe left office, Russia was already under at least 22,000 sanctions.
Isn’t that ridiculous.
It’s like the Versailles treaty multiplied and copied and rehashed by the thousands of times. By the west.
The only answer to such a big devil’s work is to deploy a nuke arsenal to space (Earth orbit) and taunt the devil or devils.
You wanna a 1Mt warhead or a 300 kt warhead or a 5Mt warhead. Please accompany your reply with your sanctions number !
Jim
July 30, 2025 at 11:26 am
Sir, the Trump goal is to get a cease fire which quickly evolves into a Korean-style armistice where Kiev is made a de facto NATO member by rebuilding their military in NATO’s image and reflecting NATO’s policy goals regarding Russia.
(Trump would take this as a win because he didn’t start the war and 80% of Ukraine would functionally be a de facto NATO force on Russia’s southern border, with the potential to quickly reach into Russia’s defensive depth and center. This goal was the reason for the Russian invasion in Feb.’22, to prevent NATO from expanding up to their border.)
What’s the point? Sanctions haven’t worked to bring Russia to its knees and force it to withdraw from Ukraine, cause Putin to be removed, and even cause the unlikely development of the dissolution of the Russian Federation… such were the grandiose aims of the Ukraine policy.
So, Russia has overcome the sanctions policy of the United States… it’s unlikely any new round of sanctions will work.
But have at it… nothing else seems to be working either.
When a military action constitutes an existential threat for a country as perceived by its leaders (as Russian leaders see Ukraine’s potential NATO membership) sanctions aren’t going to cow them into accepting that existential threat.
Sorry, the author’s contention super-duper sanctions will work is equivalent to the idea throwing good money after bad into a sinkhole will work.
Kind of a mini-me approach to the whole affair in Ukraine: keep doing what hasn’t worked… hoping more of the same will eventually work.
It won’t. The Russians won’t bow to sanctions anymore than they’ve already bowed to sanctions… on the contrary, they haven’t flinched from the start when everybody was in suspense on what the sanctions would do to Russia, including the Russians, themselves.
But they soldiered on and the sanctions never worked.
More sanctions, now, won’t work either.
When the choice is accepting the imposition of an existential threat versus imposition of economic sanctions, it’s an easy choice to make, do your best to work around or overcome the sanctions. (And destroy the existential threat by any means necessary.)
That’s what the Russians are in the process of doing in a deliberate and methodical manner.