Key Points – Russia’s drone industry, despite the extensive use of UAVs in Ukraine, faces significant shortcomings compared to Ukraine’s innovative and adaptable approach.
-Russian efforts often rely on less capable, expensive licensed copies of foreign military drones or mass deployment of imported designs like the Iranian Shahed, reflecting a rigid development path.
-Critically, severe labor shortages reportedly plague Russian drone manufacturing, allegedly leading to the exploitation of thousands of North Korean civilian workers and young African women duped into assembling drones under harsh conditions for low pay at facilities like Alabuga Start.
-These factors contribute to Russia’s drones being “less impressive” than Ukraine’s.
Russia’s Drone Problem: From Copied Tech to Exploited Foreign Workers
The war in Ukraine has become one in which the most common weapon used in the largest numbers by either side is drones. Surveillance, one-way suicide models, anti-personnel, anti-armored vehicle drones, artillery-spotting platforms, and large bombardment drones—as well as dozens of other types—fill the skies above the battlefields.
They are also becoming the most significant long-range weapon in this war, as the June 1 Operation Spiderweb demonstrated for the entire world’s audience of military analysts.
However, the success stories primarily focus on Ukrainian drones achieving remarkable results through inventive and daring missions. There have been almost no comparable anecdotes or instances of Russian drones achieving any kind of significant strike on Ukraine or its military.
There are some specific reasons for this disparity we see in this war. The Ukrainian military has been a paragon of inventiveness and innovation with its use of drones to hit Moscow’s military infrastructure. On the other hand, Russia has produced wave after wave of copies of Iran’s notorious Shaheed models that are used to bombard civilian population centers.
Russian Drone Models
In the past year, the Russian military has been utilizing several basic types of drones—some of which they design or develop in-house and others that are copies of another nation’s design, which Russia modifies using local content for the internal systems.
There are, however, several aspects of the Russian drone models that have kept them from being the daily front-page story in this war that the Ukrainian systems have become known for.
One is that several of the Russian designs are less capable copies of another nation’s system, which was initially designed for military use. Russia’s Forpost drone is a licensed replica of the Israeli-design Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) Searcher.
Problem number one with these kinds of drones is that they are not cheap to build, and they are even less affordable to operate. They are also available in limited quantities. Russia also reportedly produces them without the use of any imported components, which can add to the cost per unit.
Secondly, the very real genius behind the Ukrainian drone designs lies in their ability to adapt low-cost commercial designs for military use. By using very young laborers who are more familiar with the technology and methods of their operation, plus a tremendous amount of DIY techniques in adapting these systems for their military’s needs, the Ukrainian industry achieves a good measure of synergism.
In short, the Russian design and development path is far more rigid and less willing to adopt unconventional and/or higher-risk solutions. The reason the Shahed has become the go-to system for the Russian military is that it was already developed, and its design was proven by the Iranians’ use of the platform in previous conflicts. That makes it a “safe” choice with the fewest chances of something going wrong.
Lastly, Russia is increasingly flying fewer types of drones. The fewer the models of drones being launched against the Ukrainians, the fewer models that countermeasures need to be devised to defeat them. It makes them easier to target, and therefore, their effectiveness degrades exponentially.
The Dark Side
There is also a darker side to the Russian drone industry that accounts for their systems being less impressive than those developed in Ukraine. Russia has been suffering a progressively expanding labor shortage, making it difficult for Moscow‘s military enterprises to maintain the necessary production tempo.
One answer has been for Russia to take in thousands of North Korean laborers to become the assembly-line workers for their drone models.
In late October 2024, President Zelensky stated that North Korea was sending not only military personnel to Russia but also a large number of civilian workers and that they would be working in Russia’s military factories.
“The troop deployment negotiations [with Moscow] include a large number of civilians, who are expected to be sent to work in specific military factories of the Russian Federation,” he said. “Russia also has production facilities for the ‘Shahed’ drones provided by the Iranian government. Therefore, the DPRK will gain experience working in military factories, especially those related to drones.”
In an even worse development, one of Russia’s drone manufacturers, Alabuga Start, has been advertising in Africa as offering a work-study program in Russia for “ambitious young women.”
The company is now accused of engaging in human trafficking and duping these young African women who end up on drone production lines once they arrive in Russia.
Since 2022, Alabuga Start has recruited around 350 women from over 40 countries to work in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia’s Republic of Tatarstan. It is reported that plans are underway to bring in an additional 8,500 this year, according to an investigative report from Bloomberg.
The women being recruited are between the ages of 18 and 22. They are from countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Lesotho, and Botswana, one of Africa’s wealthiest countries per capita but also one that struggles with unemployment.
Last October, the Associated Press reported that these African women were being coerced into becoming drone assemblers in Alabuga’s factories under what are called “grueling and hazardous conditions,” and they were also paid much less than promised in the adverts that they initially responded to.
“Given these conditions and circumstances,” said a Ukrainian defense industry executive who commented on these reports of North Korean and African laborers, “it is not surprising that Russia’s drone industry is less impressive than our own.”
About the Author:
Reuben F. Johnson is a survivor of the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and is an Expert on Foreign Military Affairs with the Fundacja im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego in Warsaw. He has been a consultant to the Pentagon, several NATO governments, and the Australian government in the fields of defense technology and weapon systems design. Over the past 30 years he has resided in and reported from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Brazil, the People’s Republic of China and Australia.
Russia’s Submarines
