Key Points and Summary – Politico’s report on Germany weighing alternatives to the Franco-German-Spanish FCAS raises a hard question: what if Paris and Berlin split before Phase 2?
-FCAS’s core fight is workshare and control over the Next-Generation Fighter—Dassault vs. Airbus—plus French carrier/nuclear requirements Germany doesn’t share.
GCAP Fighter. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
-A divorce would be asymmetric: France has the sovereign know-how to build a 6th-gen jet but faces budget strain; Germany has cash but lacks a full fighter design base.
-Pivot options—GCAP buy-in or a Sweden tie-up—bring limited influence or new risk.
Worst case, Europe funds three rival jets, diluting orders, spiking costs, and slowing capability.
What Would Happen if France and Germany Divorce Their FCAS Stealth Fighter Programs?
This September, Politico reported that the Luftwaffe briefed the Bundestag on options for Germany to pivot away from its joint project to develop and field a sixth-generation stealth fighter with France (and Spain) by examining the potential for alternate partnerships with the UK and France. The ever-combative CEO of French aerospace giant Dassault sneered that they were welcome to try.
This ripple comes eight years into France and Germany’s shared Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program.
A conference in October between the defense ministers of FCAS may provide a final opportunity to address grievances, allowing FCAS to proceed to Phase 2: the design and construction of a crewed demonstrator aircraft. This Tuesday, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius denied that recent talks with Sweden had involved the FCAS, but rather the purchase of the GlobalEye early warning aircraft.
Nonetheless, the mood is sufficiently dire that both France and Germany must genuinely consider alternatives if they can’t reach an agreement by early 2026.
Losing the opportunity to split the staggering development costs—estimated to range between €40 and €60 billion—would be a massive setback to all parties.
The consequences of a divorce would be asymmetric, however. On one hand, suffering from economic doldrums, France may struggle harder to afford solo development. However, it has a pre-existing technological base to independently develop next-generation fighters and high-thrust turbofan engines. Germany doesn’t, despite great wealth.
FCAS versus GCAP
Germany and France launched the FCAS in 2017, aiming to develop a stealth fighter to replace their respective fleets of Typhoons and Rafales by 2040. Spain joined the FCAS in 2019, and Belgium became a junior partner, contributing funding, in 2023.
Tempest Fighter. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Technically, FCAS (or SCAF in France) has discrete components: a Next Generation Fighter (NGF) being developed by France’s Dassault, supporting loyal wingman drones by Airbus called Remote Carriers, and a unifying combat cloud by Spain’s Indra. All three countries would split engine development.
A year after FCAS’s debut, the UK launched its own sixth-generation program—technically also named FCAS, but better known as Tempest. This evolved into a British-Italian-Japanese consortium called Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) seeking to field operational fighters by 2035.
Tempest Fighter from BAE Systems.
However, while Tempest/GCAP has generated years of positive press about planned technological advancements and airframe concepts, media reports on FCAS have primarily focused on continuing disputes between France and Germany.
Why France and Germany Struggle to Agree On FCAS
Many factors are at play, but the primary bones of contention are disagreements between aviation giants Dassault and Airbus over project leadership and workshare of the crewed NGF fighter—i.e., which country’s manufacturers do the most work and reap the greatest profits from the aircraft they have all committed to buying? NGF is by far the most challenging and expensive aspect of FCAS.
Germany and Spain would prefer an equally divided workshare and an equal influence in the design committee. However, Dassault argues that, as the party responsible for building the lynchpin NGF fighter—and the only country with the expertise to do so independently—it’s better qualified and deserves a larger workshare on NGF. German sources indicate that Dassault seeks an 80% share, a percentage viewed by Germans as ceding effective sovereignty over production.
Dassault also argues it should be accorded leadership of the NGF design committee (not FCAS as a whole) to avert committee-driven delays. The French reportedly allege that the addition of Spain has systematically aligned the committee 2-to-1 in favor of Airbus.
There are also allegedly design disputes. France specifically insists that FCAS be suitable for carrier-based operations, as France is the only European country to operate an aircraft carrier with a catapult-launch and barrier-assisted recovery (CATOBAR) system, similar to those on U.S. Navy carriers. This requires heavier landing gears, kinematic optimization for low-speed and low-altitude handling, and a preference for a lower airframe weight of 15 tons or less.
By contrast, the purely land-based Luftwaffe doesn’t care about landing on short runways, and reportedly would prefer a heavier 18-ton air superiority fighter optimizing high-altitude and high-speed performance.
Furthermore, France requires FCAS to take on the air-based nuclear deterrence mission armed with nuclear missiles—presumably the ASN4G hypersonic scramjet cruise missile targeted for service in 2035. That’s another feature Germany and Spain wouldn’t benefit from.
However, these French non-negotiables should have been 100% unsurprising entering the FCAS program, as France exited the preceding Eurofighter program for the same reasons.
France Can Build Jet Fighters Without Partners. Germany Can’t
France developed and exported numerous jet fighters during the Cold War, all but a few designs without foreign partners—including its current 4.5-generation Rafale. Maintaining a self-sufficient defense industry has historically been a priority for Paris.
By contrast, in the decade following World War II, Germany was not permitted to revive its military aerospace industry. However, restrictions were lifted in 1955, unlike Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, Germany’s subsequent fighter programs all involved foreign partners—notably Italy and the UK for the Panavia Tornado and the subsequent Eurofighter Typhoon.
Eurofighter Typhoon over the Water. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Thus, Germany’s jet fighter industry remains reliant on partnerships. And while press reports indicate Berlin is evaluating the option of going it alone with Spain, it too lacks the necessary experience. Germany could invest the large sums and time needed to rebuild an independent fighter-production industry—but the political will may be lacking.
Hypothetically, Germany could opt to develop crewed fighters and focus on unmanned aircraft for indigenous production. That’s more readily achievable—though again, in Europe, only France and the UK have built prototype stealth combat drones. Whether they could soon substitute for manned stealth fighters is unclear. Neither the air forces of China nor the United States seems to think so.
Meanwhile, France’s fixation on defense self-sufficiency would likely ensure a domestic 6th-generation fighter should FCAS fail. However, the current economic and political climate could delay that project.
A Swedish Saviour?
Berlin is contemplating whether it can change horses mid-race. The UK can produce fighters independently and has historically partnered with Germany. However, persuading London to initiate a second sixth-generation fighter program in parallel with GCAP, which might eventually compete with it, is quite the ask! Not only does the UK likely lack the spare finances and industrial capacity, but its GCAP partners would probably not support it.
GCAP 6th Generation Fighter.
Undoubtedly, London would be happy to sell GCAP aircraft to Germany. Perhaps it could offer to eventually cooperate with Berlin on a German-specific variant.
However, a GCAP ‘buy-in’ would likely yield only minor industrial concessions at best for Germany, as the trilateral consortium will be highly reluctant to cede significant workshare and technologies to a latecomer. Member states will also want to ensure GCAP production goes toward their own air force’s pressing needs.
Therefore, buying GCAP would leave Berlin with even less workshare and influence on the final product than FCAS. On the plus side, Berlin could avoid paying development costs; however, this would mean that procurement expenditures would not benefit its domestic industries.
Sweden is a more intriguing potential white knight for Germany’s FCAS ambitions. Like France, Sweden has developed a 4.5-generation fighter independently—the Saab Gripen-E—remarkably, with just over one-seventh of France’s population. Admittedly, the Gripen relies more on American components than Typhoon or Rafale, notably including American engines. Volvo Aero, which formerly built Swedish jet engines (usually based on foreign designs), was sold to a British company in 2012.
Given the exponential increase in fighter development costs, Sweden is also likely to need a partner for its sixth-generation fighter program, called Flygsystem 2020, with production aimed at 2035.
Early overtures for Swedish involvement in Tempest were unsuccessful. Hypothetically, Germany could present a second chance for Sweden to find a partner for a sixth-generation fighter. Perhaps Stockholm could provide the expertise and Berlin the financial muscle to realize it. Engine design, however, might still require sourcing abroad.
Can Europe’s Defense Industry Sustain Three Competing Sixth-generation Fighters?
If the FCAS program ultimately splits into two separate projects, the risks of program failure for these projects may be greater individually due to shortfalls in funding and expertise. However, if both successor programs and GCAP conclude successfully, that would result in three separate sixth-generation designs competing in the same exclusive market, rather than two, making it harder for each to achieve profitability, reduce unit costs, and finance the development of upgrades. And that’s before counting potential competition from exported American sixth-generation aircraft.
Commercial success is vital to sustaining the effectiveness of combat aircraft, as export orders improve economies of scale for both unit costs and lifetime sustainment. Profits and export contracts also enable the development of upgrades.
Consider a few examples:
-The US is procuring F-15EX fighters, combining advancements that were progressively developed for F-15s exported to various Middle Eastern clients a quarter-century earlier.
-Economies of scale allow the U.S. to build F-35A stealth fighters at lower costs than Europe’s non-stealth aircraft. (Sustainment costs, alas, are another story.)
-A 1990s ban on F-22 exports likely led to the early shutdown of its manufacturing base after U.S. orders were downsized, resulting in painfully high unit costs. That limited the cost efficiency of upgrading more dated F-22 components, contributing to the airframe’s early planned retirement in the late 2030s.
Therefore, Europe’s future sixth-generation jets require commercial success—i.e., large numbers of aircraft ordered—to sustain both European airpower and Europe’s military aerospace industry. But commercial success will be harder for all to achieve if aircraft orders are split between three European designs instead of two.
The incentives to keep FCAS intact remain strong. The coming months will tell whether that will suffice to reconcile opposing notions of fairness and begin transitioning FCAS from a digital mockup to a flying prototype.
About the Author: Defense Expert Sebastian Roblin
Sebastien Roblin writes on the technical, historical, and political aspects of international security and conflict for publications including The National Interest, NBC News, Forbes.com, and War is Boring. He holds a Master’s degree from Georgetown University and served with the Peace Corps in China. Roblin is also a National Security Journal Contributing Editor.
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